We investigate the effect of remittances from migrated family members on informal interhousehold transfers, an issue that has received limited attention in the literature. Using rich panel data from urban Ethiopia, we show that receiving international remittances increases the value of private domestic inter-household transfers, whereas receiving domestic remittances does not have any effect. We also show that the transfers sent respond to shocks to a great extent.
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Introduction
In this paper, we use rich panel data spanning 15 years to investigate whether international remittances stimulate inter-household transfers in urban Ethiopia. Households in developing countries are vulnerable to risk and shocks and generally lack access to formal financial markets to insure themselves accordingly. Instead, households engage in a variety of informal strategies to mitigate risk and cope with shocks. For example, they may adjust their production choices and asset portfolios and engage in precautionary savings, gift-giving, and informal transfers (Paxson, 1992; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993; Udry, 1995; Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997) . International remittances are a type of informal transfer that has attracted increasing attention in the literature on transfers in developing countries in recent years. According to the World Bank (2011), the value of international remittances to the developing world reached US $350 billion in 2011, which is 50 percent more than the total official development assistance that these countries received from the developed world in the same year. The rapid increase in international remittances has sparked a large number of studies attempting to measure their impact on various household outcomes, including poverty, education, health, labor supply, and investment in recipient countries. 1 Several previous studies (e.g., Adams et al., 2008 in Ghana; Lokshin et al., 2010 in Nepal; Taylor et. al, 2005 in Mexico; Yang & Martinez, 2006 in the Philippines; and Alem, 2015 in Ethiopia) have documented that remittances improve consumption by recipient households and hence reduce poverty, but the impact on inequality is more ambiguous. Due to the often-high costs involved in international migration, migrants tend to be found at the higher ends of the income distribution and international remittances can thus lead to an increase in inequality (see, for example, Barham & Boucher, 1998, for Nicaragua; Rodriguez 1998, for the Philippines; and Adams & Cuecuecha, 2010 for Indonesia). However, it was also found that, as the number of migrants increase, income inequality may be reduced due to network effects that reduce the migration costs and make migration affordable to low-income households (see, for example, McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007; Taylor et al. 2005 ).
Remittances also have been shown to help households reduce consumption volatility (Combes & Ebeke, 2010) , loosen liquidity constraints, and finance long-term human and physical capital investment (Taylor, 1999) . A related strand of literature has also studied private inter-household transfer flows within countries (see, e.g., Cox, 1987; Cox, et al. 1998b Cox, et al. , 2004 . Studies from various developing countries indicate that a large share of households are involved in private financial transfers and gift-giving with other households (e.g., Kazianga, 2006) and that households use 2 these transfers as risk-sharing mechanisms (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Foster & Rosenzweig, 2001) .
Although the impact of remittances on household outcomes and private transfer flows has been investigated separately in numerous previous studies, much less is known about the inter-linkages between receiving remittances and the sending of private inter-household transfers. Receiving remittances might enable a household to share more of its resources with other households, which could lead to trickle-down effects on non-migrant households that do not directly receive remittances. 2 Investigating this issue is relevant because, if households increase their transfers when they receive international remittances, then the effect of international remittances on welfare in recipient countries extends beyond the direct recipient households. This paper uses five rounds of rich panel data spanning 15 years from urban Ethiopia to investigate whether international and domestic remittances stimulate private inter-household transfers.
Urban Ethiopia is a valuable setting for studying the role of international remittances in stimulating inter-household transfers. The value of international remittances received by the country has increased rapidly in the last decade, and it has been shown that they play an important role in reducing households' poverty (Alem, 2015) and in improving subjective well-being among both urban and rural households (Alem & Köhlin, 2013; Andersson, 2012) . In recent years, Ethiopia has also experienced rapid economic growth and double-digit inflation. The high inflation has negatively affected the welfare of the urban population, and informal transfers have become an important coping mechanism (Alem & Söderbom, 2012) . In this context, analysis of the potential links between remittances and private transfers using robust panel data models on relatively long panel data provides an important opportunity to explore the additional channels through which remittances can affect household outcomes in migrant source countries.
We provide regression-based evidence that international remittances stimulate private interhousehold transfers, while domestic remittances do not. We estimate alternative panel data models, controlling for household fixed effects (time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity) to disentangle the effect of remittances on households' transfer behavior. Our results show that a one percent increase in the value of remittances received from abroad results in a 0.07 percent increase in transfers to other households. This finding provides some evidence on the trickle-down welfare effects of international remittances on households in recipient countries. However, we do not find a statistically significant impact of domestic remittances on inter-household transfers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and presents the Ethiopian context. Section 3 describes the panel data, and Section 4 outlines the empirical 2 Other possible trickle-down effects of international remittances, which are beyond the scope of the current study, are community remittances and transfers. These are remittances sent by migrants to the wider community, e.g., charitable organizations in the countries of origin (Brown et al. 2014 3 models used in the analysis. Section 5 presents the main empirical results from alternative linear panel data models, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Private Inter-household Transfers
Private inter-household transfers are likely to be the main source of loans and transfers in developing countries, where there are limited public welfare programs and imperfect formal financial markets.
Households form economic ties with each other and engage in income transfers, gift exchange, and other transactions to smooth consumption. In a seminal paper, Townsend (1994) shows how households in a village create informal arrangements to mitigate risk. Empirical evidence shows that inter-household transfers, remittances, and gifts are used for consumption-smoothing purposes in rural areas (Lucas & Stark, 1985; Rosenzweig, 1988) . Similarly, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) show that households in rural Philippines rely on gift-giving and zero-interest informal credit as risk-sharing mechanisms within networks of friends and relatives. Although most studies on private inter-household transfers have focused on rural households, there is some evidence that such transfers also play an important role in risk sharing in urban areas of developing countries (e.g., Cox & Jimenez, 1998a; Kanzianga, 2006; Alvi & Dendir, 2009 ).
Apart from acting as important risk-sharing mechanisms, private inter-household transfers can potentially affect household welfare by redistributing the income gains from remittances sent from abroad. Most studies investigating the impact of remittances on households assume that the benefits are limited to the recipient households. The three exceptions to this observation are Yang and Martinez (2006) , Beyene (2012), and Brown et al. (2014) . Yang and Martinez (2006) provide empirical evidence from the Philippines that remittances also affect non-recipient households. Their results show that an increase in remittances due to an exchange rate shock led to a decrease in poverty, not only for migrant households but also for non-migrant households. They also show that an increase in the amount of remittances received from abroad increased the gift receipts by nonmigrant households, suggesting that transfers between migrant and non-migrant households could at least partly explain the poverty reduction among non-migrant households in the Philippines. Using a simple insurance model and the 2004 wave of the panel data that we use in the present paper, Beyene (2012) documented that remittances have a positive impact on the amount of transfers sent to other households in urban Ethiopia, controlling for total household income and other covariates.
The study by Brown et al. (2014) uses novel survey data on migrant households from Tonga, Samoa and the Cook Islands in Australia to investigate the role of social pressures on migrants to share their income with the wider community in their home country, a phenomenon described as 4 community remittances. These authors document that social pressures, the impact of which differs across locations, are important determinants of community transfers, which have impact beyond migrant households in the recipient countries.
How the sending of inter-household transfers responds to remittances received ultimately depends on the motives for sending transfers. Although determining the underlying transfer motives goes beyond the scope of this paper, theories of why households send transfers can give some guidance on how receiving remittances affects the sending of inter-household transfers. Three main models explaining the sending of private inter-household transfers are discussed and tested in the literature: the altruistic model, where the donor is driven by a concern about the well-being of the recipient and transfers depend on the financial situation of the donor and the recipient (Becker, 1974) ; the exchange motive model, where transfers are driven by reciprocity (Cox, 1987; Foster & Rosenzweig, 2001) ; and finally the mutual insurance model, where the donor enters into mutual agreements and uses transfers to smooth consumption (Townsend, 1994) . 3
Previous empirical studies on the motives driving inter-household transfers have typically been carried out by exploring how these transfers vary with the income of the recipient. 4 The studies are often motivated by concerns about crowding out, i.e., the effect of public transfer programs might be neutralized if public transfers are followed by compensatory reductions in private transfers.
Controlling for all other relevant household variables, the present study will take the income (or more precisely the remittance income) of the donor into account to shed light on how different motives could imply different predictions regarding the relationship between remittances and interhousehold transfers. If altruism is the dominant motive, and the donor is concerned about the well-being of the recipient, an increase in remittances will lead to an increase in the sending of inter-household transfers. The same prediction holds for the exchange motive: an increase in remittances received enables the donor to send more transfers in anticipation of more assistance in the future from transfer recipients. However, the predictions are more ambiguous if the decision to send inter-household transfers is based on insurance motives. Dercon (2005) argues that households may have incentives to leave a risk-sharing arrangement if they feel that staying in the arrangement is no longer in their interest. This could occur, for example, when a household experiences a positive income shock and prefers to make private investments rather than use the money to support others, or when the household gets access to a new source of risk reduction or protection. Dercon's (2005) reasoning, households that receive remittances, and remittances from abroad in particular, might be less willing to engage in informal insurance arrangements if they feel that the income source in the form of remittances offers enough protection against adverse shocks. Hence, the effect of remittances on inter-household transfers is not clear a priori. Transfer motives may also affect how transfer patterns respond to an adverse shock. If the motives are altruistic, an adverse shock that affects the income of the household may lead to a decrease in the transfers sent. However, if other motives are at play, such as mutual insurance, the shock may not automatically translate into a decrease in inter-household transfers sent. The panel data we use in this paper, which spans the period when urban households in Ethiopia were severely affected by the 2008 food price inflation, enables us to shed light on the transfer motives of remittance-receiving households.
Consistent with

The Ethiopian Context
Ethiopia makes an interesting case study to investigate the links between remittances and interhousehold transfers. International remittance flows to the country have increased rapidly over the past decade. Alvi and Dendir (2009) show that households in urban areas in Ethiopia use transfers (including remittances, inter-household transfers, and gifts) as insurance against risks.
They show that about one-third of these households are involved in transfer activities and that gifts and transfers respond positively to measures of vulnerability such as unemployment and illness of household heads.
The historic migration patterns in Ethiopia have been shaped by a mix of economic, political, and environmental factors. A noticeable international out-migration took place after the 1974 revolution and the political upheavals and instability that followed. The migrants were predominantly young and educated people from the urban elite. Later, the wish to migrate spread to other parts of the urban population, and in the 1980s the Middle East attracted migrants from both rural and urban areas (Aredo, 2005) . The migration to the Middle East has since then expanded, especially among women, and is today one of the largest migration flows from Ethiopia (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009; Kebede, 2002) . Following the increase in the number of Ethiopian migrants abroad, international remittances to the country have increased substantially in recent years. According The recent period when Ethiopia experienced a rapid increase in remittances (especially international remittances) was also characterized by rapid inflation. In July 2008, commodity prices were on average 52 percent higher than 12 months earlier, exhibiting the highest rate of inflation in Ethiopian history. The general inflation the country experienced in that period was mainly driven by food prices rising on average 92 percent in the 12-month period (Central Statistics Agency, 2008 ). Urban Ethiopian households were severely affected by the food price inflation and about 87 percent of them reported that it was the most influential shock during that period (Alem & Söderbom, 2012; Headey et al., 2012) . Households had to cope with the shock by, for example, cutting back on quantities served per meal and receiving assistance from relatives and friends. One objective of the present paper is therefore to investigate how the links between remittances and inter-household transfers may be affected by an adverse shock.
Empirical Approach
Our main aim is to explore the effects of remittances on inter-household transfers in urban Ethiopia, and to shed light on whether the transfer behavior responds to the occurrence of shocks. Thus, our main outcome variable of interest is the real value of money transferred out by households. We specify a linear transfer equation for panel data as follows: 
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where subscript i denotes household, and t year. F it is the real value of money sent by household i at time t. I it corresponds to the real value of international remittances received by household i at time t, and D it represents the real value of internal (domestic) remittances received. In addition to these core variables, we include a set of household head variables, other household-level variables, and city and time dummies as controls, X, which determine the amount of money sent by households. C i corresponds to the household fixed effect (unobserved heterogeneity).
The other explanatory variables captured in X it include characteristics of the household head (age, gender, labor market status, and education); real monthly consumption expenditures per adult equivalent unit, a proxy measure of economic status; and occupational and demographic characteristics of other household members. Our consumption measure was constructed as the sum of food and non-food expenditures. The consumption expenditure aggregated at the household level has been adjusted for spatial and temporal price differences using carefully constructed price indices from the survey. In order to account for economies of scale and differences in needs, we computed consumption expenditure in adult equivalent units. 6
Previous research has also suggested that there might be different underlying motives for private transfers depending on the standard of living of the sender household (Cox et al. 2004; Kazianga, 2006; Clément, 2008) , i.e., the transfer response to remittances might depend on how well off the household is. We investigate this by allowing the effect of receiving remittances to vary with the education level of household heads, which captures the ability of households to generate income.
In doing so, we create interaction terms between international remittances and education level of household heads and control for them in the empirical model specified above.
The fundamental problem encountered in estimating Equation (1) using OLS is the possible correlation between X it and C i . If such a correlation does not exist, i.e., if E(X it C i ) = 0, OLS would be consistent. However, if there is no correlation, the random effects model, which works in a Generalized Least Square (GLS) framework, would yield a more efficient estimator of the β parameters. Very often in applied research, however, the assumption is made that E(X it C i ) = 0 is strong, even though the U it s are independently distributed. There are several cases under which some of the explanatory variables including remittances (our core variables) would be correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity term C i . For example, in the context of the transfer equation formulated above, sending a migrant abroad and receiving remittances would most likely be correlated with unobserved household characteristics. It is also possible to argue that, if recipient households that are under pressure to make transfers to other households in their communities are more likely to request more remittances from international migrants, the unobserved household heterogeneity term C i will be correlated with the remittance variables in the regression model. 8 also could be correlated with many other explanatory variables, such as educational achievement, as some household members may have a higher level of motivation to pursue higher level education.
All of these possible correlations will introduce endogeneity bias.
The most credible way of estimating the β parameters by disentangling the unobserved heterogeneity term is application of the fixed effects model, which works through OLS estimation of the within transformation of the basic equation stated in (1). 7 One limitation of this estimator, however, is that the coefficients of time-invariant observable characteristics cannot be identified, as they are dropped through the within transformation. If the interest is focused on the time-varying variables of the model, the fixed effects estimator provides the most robust parameter estimates (Wooldridge, 2010) . If the random effects model is not supported by the test 8 and there is interest in the βs of the time-invariant variables, the reasonable model to consider is the Hausman-Taylor two-stage model. The model can be specified as:
where the X variables are time-varying and the W variables are time-invariant. The variables with index 1 are assumed to be uncorrelated with both C i and U it , while the ones with index 2 are correlated with C i but not with U it . Hausman and Taylor show that Equation (2) can be estimated by instrumental variables using the following variables as instruments: X 1,it , W 1i , X 2,it − X 2i , and X 1i . 9 Identification requires that the number of variables in X 1,it is at least as large as that in W 2i (Verbeek, 2012) .
In order to investigate the magnitude of the relationship between remittances and household transfer behavior, we estimate different panel data models. However, because the model identifies the coefficients of the time-invariant variables, we will mainly use the Hausman-Taylor model to discuss regression results for most of the variables.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical analysis is based on five rounds of the Ethiopian Urban Socio-economic Survey (EUSS), a panel dataset collected in 1994, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2009 . The first four waves of 7 This estimator is based on the key assumption that the unobserved household heterogeneity term C i is time-
The standard test for this is the Hausman test, which tests for the null hypothesis that E(X it C i ) = 0 (Wooldridge, 2010) . 9 The exogenous variables serve as their own instruments, X 2,it is instrumented by its deviation from individual means (as in the fixed effects approach), and W 2i is instrumented by the individual average of X 1,it . One attractive advantage of the Hausman-Taylor estimator is that it does not require the use of external instruments. Given that the sample size had to be reduced substantially in the most recent wave, it is reasonable to be concerned about bias in the estimation results as a result of attrition. Alem (2015) and Alem et al. (2014) , who used the panel dataset for related research, attempted to investigate attrition bias using attrition probits (Fitzgerald et al., 1998 ) and a Becketti, Gould, Lillard, and
Welch (BGLW) test (Becketti et al., 1988) . Attrition probits represent estimates of binary-choice models for the determinants of attrition in later periods as a function of base year characteristics.
The BGLW test, on the other hand, involves investigating the effect of future attrition on the initial period's outcome variable. Based on these tests, the authors conclude that it is unlikely that attrition in the sample would bias the results for the remaining sample.
The dataset contains rich information at the individual and household levels related to household demographics, education, health, labor market status, and household consumption. Information on domestic and international remittances received and transfers sent by households in the 12 months prior to the survey was also included. 11 The transfers recorded in the survey can be divided 10 Other cities were not covered due to resource constraints. 11 It is possible to be concerned that some of the international remittances might have been transferred through the household for other households not covered in our survey. However, the EUSS survey questions were explicit and into three main categories: remittances from abroad, remittances from domestic sources, and gifts received. 12 In this study, we focus on the first two transfer flows. The survey recorded values of both cash and in-kind transfers. In the case of in-kind remittances, the households were asked to estimate the monetary value in the local currency, Ethiopian Birr (ETB). The variable for transfers sent by a household is derived from a survey question about the total value of transfers given by the household in the 12 months prior to the survey. The question about private transfers given is hence not as detailed as the questions about transfers received. 13 There is no detailed information about the recipient households and the purpose of the transfers. the last year. The mean amounts of international remittances received in real terms were highest in 2004 and lowest in 2009. Domestic remittances also followed the same trend of increasing and then decreasing in the last round. Thus, it is evident that more households received remittances in later years, but the mean values received in real terms declined over time, especially in the case of international remittances. One potential explanation could be that, during the food price shock in 2008, the need for remittances increased and migrants consequently sent remittances to asked about remittances received by household members only, who sent them and how they were spent. On average, about 85 percent of international remittances have been used to augment household consumption. 12 The data in earlier waves did not differentiate between gifts from abroad and gifts from domestic sources.
Consequently, we excluded gifts from the analysis. The mean value of gifts received in 2009 in real terms was negligible, about 17.06 ETB, ten times less than the mean value of international remittances. The survey also includes questions on public transfers, such as food aid and food-for-work. These transfers represent a very small proportions of the transfers received by the households and are also excluded from the analysis. 13 As discussed by, e.g., Cox et al., (2004) , asking much more detailed questions about transfers received than transfers sent could potentially lead to an underestimation of transfers sent. We do not, however, find a statistically significant impact of domestic remittances. The variable is weakly significant (at 10 percent) in the OLS regression but not in any of the panel data models and its magnitude (0.02) is substantially lower than that of international remittances. As shown in the descriptive statistics presented in the previous section, the strong impact of international remittances on inter-household transfers is likely due to international remittances being larger and having increased substantially in recent years. The results provide evidence that receiving international remittances enables households to share more of their resources with other households, which leads to trickle-down effects on non-migrant households that do not directly receive international remittances. The increases in inter-household transfers in response to international remittances provide some support for the altruistic and insurance motives. About 82 percent of international remittances received by households were sent by their grown children, which suggests additional evidence for these motives.
Regression Results
Sending of inter-household transfers is also influenced by the economic status of the sending Given that the coefficient of the international remittances variable estimated using the Hausman-Taylor model presented in Table 2 is 0.07, one would wonder if such magnitude is large enough to be economically meaningful. We attempt to shed more light on this using binary models of transfer where the dependent variable and the remittance variables are all dummies. The regression results are presented in Table 3 . Column 1 reports results from a pooled probit model, and
Column 2 reports the corresponding marginal effects. The panel version of the binary probit model uses a random effects framework with a strong assumption of orthogonality in the vectors of the explanatory variables and unobserved household heterogeneity. In order to generate meaningful parameter estimates, we allowed correlation between the explanatory variables and the unobserved heterogeneity term following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982) and estimated the "correlated random effects probit estimator" (Column 3). Column 4 reports the marginal effects from this model. Both models confirm the strong statistical significance of international remittances in 13 affecting inter-household transfers. According to the marginal effects computed from the correlated random effects probit model (Column 4), a household that receives international remittances has a 3.4 percent higher likelihood of engaging in inter-household transfer. The results also show that domestic remittances are weakly significant (at the 10 percent level) in the binary choice models. Söderbom, 2012; Alem et al., 2014; Alem, 2015; Gebremedhin & Whelan, 2005) have documented that these types of households enjoy higher levels of consumption and subjective well-being and are less likely to be in poverty. This probably reflects the large return to tertiary education in the rapidly growing Ethiopian urban sector. The results also show that male-headed households are more likely than female-headed households to send inter-household transfers.
The present paper takes a comprehensive view of the household and considers the role of other household members in household decisions. We control for a broad set of other household members' occupational and demographic characteristics in our transfer equations. All three linear models presented in Table 2 suggest that not only household head characteristics but also other household members' occupational and demographic characteristics have a significant effect on the amount of transfers sent. Consistent with our discussion above, households with more members earning a living as a self-employed worker, a civil/public sector worker, or a private sector worker send more inter-household transfers. This likely captures the role of other household members in householdlevel decisions and highlights the importance of controlling for them in addition to the commonly used household head characteristics. All regression results consistently suggest that households with a larger number of children transfer more. This may appear to be counter-intuitive, as a higher dependency ratio is expected to put financial pressure on the household, thus reducing the tendency to engage in transfer to other households. There is, however, empirical evidence from earlier studies (e.g., Cox & Stark, 1998; Jellal & Wolff, 2000) documenting that parents directly this question are consistent with this observation. 16 The data shows that approximately 22 percent of the households identified assistance from relatives or friends as their main coping mechanism to cope with the food price shock, making it second in importance only to cutting back on quantities served per meal.
Heterogeneous Effects by Education
Previous research has suggested that the motives for inter-household transfers for the sending household may vary with the standard of living of the household (Cox et al., 2004; Kazianga, 2006; Clément, 2008) . It is therefore possible that the transfer response to remittances depends on how well off the household is. We investigate whether receiving remittances has a differential impact on transfers sent out by allowing the effect of receiving remittances to vary with the education level of household heads, which captures the underlying ability of households to generate income. In doing so, we created interaction terms between the educational level of household heads and international remittances and ran all regression models. 17
The regression results with interaction terms for private transfer equations are presented in (2012), the most widespread and severe shock that the households faced was by far the food price shock: 94 percent of the households stated that they had experienced such a shock, and 87 percent identified the increase in food prices as the shock with the strongest impact on the household. 17 The ideal variable that captures the living standard of households would be real consumption expenditure.
However, this variable appear to be highly collinear with the value of international remittances. Consequently, we decided to use educational status of heads of households.
remittances on private transfers is lower for households headed by an individual with tertiary education. The magnitude of the interaction term between tertiary education and international remittances is -0.09 and -0.08 in the fixed effects and Hausman-Taylor models, respectively. This indicates that receiving international remittances has a lower effect on inter-household transfers if the household head has completed tertiary education. Households headed by an individual with tertiary education are relatively well off and often the head works in the formal sector. In view of this, they are likely to have access to modern financial institutions and hence are less likely to engage in inter-household transfers. 
Conclusions
Households in developing countries without access to formal financial institutions engage in a variety of informal strategies to deal with risk and shocks. International remittances are a type of informal transfer that has attracted increasing attention in the literature on transfers in developing countries. This paper used five waves of panel data to investigate the role of remittances on interhousehold transfer behavior, an aspect that has not received sufficient attention in previous studies.
The availability of such a long panel dataset enabled us to control for confounding time-invariant unobserved household factors and explore the role of remittances in households' transfer behavior.
We estimated alternative linear panel data models for transfer equations by households in urban Ethiopia.
Regression results show that receiving international remittances increases the value of transfers sent by recipient households. A one percent increase in international remittances results in a 0.07% increase in inter-household transfers sent. The magnitude of domestic remittances, on the other hand, is very low (only a 0.02% increase in transfers in response to a one percent increase in domestic remittances) and statistically insignificant, suggesting that domestic remittance plays little role in stimulating inter-household transfers. The most plausible explanation for these results -suggested by the patterns in our data and the regression results -is that international remittances are larger in amount and have a positive impact on transfers sent, mainly through the altruistic and informal insurance motives. Most international remittances (about 82%) are transferred by children of household heads, providing additional evidence for these motives. We also document that both remittances and private transfers increased substantially in the period when the country experienced a rapid food price shock. This provides strong evidence that informal transfers serve as an important mechanism to cope with shocks.
It is reasonable to wonder about the economic significance of the international remittances in stimulating private transfer, as the coefficient from the Hausman-Taylor model is only 0.07, although it is statistically significant at the one percent level. Results from the correlated random effects probit model also show that households receiving international remittances are only 3.4 percent more likely to engage in transfers, although again the coefficient is statistically significant at the one percent level. Nevertheless, the paper provides the first comprehensive evidence on the possible role of international remittances in stimulating inter-household transfers, using panel data that tracks the same households for a long period in a developing country. In this sense, the results provide useful insights. If households transfer more when they receive more international remittances, the effect of international remittances on welfare in recipient countries extends beyond the direct recipient households. We document some evidence of this trickle-down effect, and thus our results shed light on the possible additional channels through which remittances can affect household outcomes in migrant source countries.
Although our panel data is rich and the longest ever to be used in the context of our topic, we acknowledge the possible limitations of our study. Our data did not contain information on which countries the international remittances were transferred from, or what were the exact motives for inter-household transfers. In addition, there are other channels -e.g., community remittances and transfers -through which remittances from abroad could have further trickle-down effects that we are not able to capture in the current study due to lack of data. Finally, while the fixed effects estimator assumes that unobserved household heterogeneity is time-invariant, there is a possibility that such heterogeneity varies over time, and as a result the parameter estimates of international remittances would be subject to some endogeneity bias. Future research with more detailed data on households' transfer motives and the characteristics of recipients of inter-household transfers, and research using a more robust empirical framework, such as an instrumental variables estimation method, could shed additional light on the topic explored. No. of own-account worker members 0.159*** 0.053 0.025*** 0.008 0.176*** 0.054 0.028*** 0.008
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